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CAPITAL JURY SELECTION IN VIRGINIA
William S. Geimer*
Selection of a jury in any criminal case is a difficult task for
attorneys. First, though we talk a good game, it is a process we
know a lot less about than we think we do. We have only an
educated hunch, often based on folklore and our anecdotal ex-
periences, of what kind of folks we want on our jury if we
could get them. Second, identifying them through the voir dire
process is a real problem. The atmosphere is artificial and
stilted, and we are not really trained in conducting conversa-
tions with prospective jurors in every day language. The process
is not helped by the fact that by the time we get to examine the
prospective jurors, the trial judge has been required by law to
ask them a series of stilted questions, hardly designed to elicit
anything useful. 1 At the close of voir dire, we are often left
with little more than we gleaned from examining the data con-
tained in the jury list to inform our hunches.
All of these problems are present and magnified in a capital
case, and there are more. In one process, we are to select a jury
that will adhere to the presumption of innocence, give our client
a fair trial on the merits, AND upon a finding of guilt of
capital murder, not be predisposed to kill him. Moreover, the
common defense counsel dilemma of trying to succeed at trial
while making a proper record for appellate review is magnified
in capital cases. In every phase of a capital case, including jury
selection, it must be remembered that the Virginia Supreme
Court will not have the only look or the last word on errors of
law. But if errors are made by the court, they must be fully
documented and objections made and preserved on all ap-
plicable grounds, INCLUDING FEDERAL GROUNDS. Other-
wise, meritorious claims may be lost, and a person executed for
whom the law says death is not the appropriate penalty. It has
happened. 2 Capital jury selection is indeed a daunting task, but
if we know what the law requires and what selection strategies
have been successful, a fair jury can be found.
In capital cases, providing effective assistance of counsel re-
quires that you investigate possible challenges to the array from
which both the grand jury and petit jury are drawn, and that in
some instances you even challenge the Commonwealth's use of
peremptory challenges. All of these possible challenges are
grounded in the right of an accused to be tried by a jury drawn
from a fair cross section of the community, that is from which
no cognizable group has been systematically excluded. 3 These
issues will be discussed in the second half of this article.
Providing effective assistance of counsel in capital cases also
requires that you do all in your power, whether the trial judge
is impatient or not, to insure that no juror will automatically
vote for death upon being satisfied that your client is guilty of
capital murder, but rather that the juror will fairly consider all
mitigating factors approved by the General Assembly as well as
any other aspect of defendant's character, record or cir-
cumstances of the offense that he proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death. 4 You are also required to insure that
prospective jurors who have conscientously held scruples against
the imposition of the death penalty, but who could consider
every penalty provided by law, including the death penalty are
not successfully challenged for cause. It is to the law and
techniques for fulfilling this duty that I turn first.
A. DEATH AND LIFE QUALIFIED JURY
1. Law
The 6th Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees criminal defendants the right to trial by an impartial
jury. The Supreme Court of Virginia has recognized that this
guarantee is also one of an impartial sentencing jury. 5 As
judges and Commonwealth Attorneys are aware, however, some
opponents of the death penalty may be systematically excluded
from serving on a capital jury. An unlimited number of
challenges for cause may be used to exclude them. The most
widely known test for excludability comes from the famous case
of Witherspoon v. Illinois,6 providing for exclusion of jurors
who make it unmistakably clear during voir dire that they
would automatically vote against the imposition of the death
penalty without regard to any evidence that might be developed
at trial, or that their opposition to the death penalty would pre-
vent them from making an impartial decision about guilt. You
can expect that the prosecutor, and sometimes the judge, will
ask a series of questions about this qualification and will follow
up on anyone who expresses any reservations with a series of
conclusory leading questions designed to harden the juror's op-
position sufficiently to warrant exclusion for cause. It is ab-
solutely essential that defense counsel undertake to rehabilitate
any juror with reservations about the death penalty. Withers-
poon holds that persons with conscientiously held scruples
against the imposition of the death penalty are qualified to sit
on capital juries so long as they are able to consider any penal-
ty provided by law. (Rehabilitation should be undertaken using
the techniques described in the next subsection.)
Witherspoon has never been overruled. In Wainwright v.
Witt,7 however, the U.S. Supreme Court relaxed the standard
in the language it used to describe a properly excludable pro-
spective juror. Instead of being excludable because of making it
"unmistakably clear" that her life vote would be "automatic,"
jurors are now excludable for cause if their scruples would
"prevent or substantially impair" their performance in accor-
dance with their oaths. The prospective juror in Witt said she
was "afraid" her personal feelings about the death penalty
would interfere with her sitting as a juror. It should be noted
well that defense counsel did not object to the disqualification
of the juror and did not ask any questions in an effort to
clarify her answers. Johnny Paul Witt was executed on March
6, 1985.
Witt can properly be viewed by defense counsel as adverse
precedent. It can be useful, however, because the accused in a
capital case is also entitled to a LIFE qualified jury. That is, he
is entitled to exclude all prospective jurors whose views in favor
of the death penalty would hinder or substantially impair their
ability to serve. This class includes (I) all potential jurors who
are satisfied that death is the appropriate penalty for all persons
who commit an intentional, premeditated murder under the ag-
gravating circumstances Virginia has designated in the definition
of capital murder.8 (II) All who are satisfied that death is the
only appropriate penalty for one who commits capital murder
where there are also one or more aggravating sentencing factors
designated by the legislature. 9 (III) All who could not give
serious consideration to the statutory mitigating factors
designated by the legislature as a basis for not voting for
death. 10 (IV) All who could not give serious consideration to
any aspect of the character, record, or circumstances of the of-
fense proferred by the defense as a basis for a sentence less
than death. 1 1 (Examination on these matters should also be
undertaken using the techniques discussed in the following
subsection.)
B. Selection Techniques
Without saying so directly, what you are attempting to do,
in addition to death and life qualifying the jury is to determine
not just what jurors think about the death penalty, but what
they will think about the evidence you will put on at the penalty
phase of the trial if it comes to that. It is virtually impossible
for one person to keep all these balls in the air. You need at
least one other person at the counsel table to evaluate the
responses as you are asking the questions. We often get a warm
feeling of security from having established rapport with a pro-
spective juror and it takes a disengaged observer to let us know
that leaving the juror on the panel would bL a terrible mistake!
Try to conduct voir dire as you would a job interview for
the position of juror. In that regard, it is usually best to talk
about some other aspect of life before getting to questions
about race, sex, and the death penalty. It is essential that this
conversation be conducted by the use of relevant, but OPEN
questions. Some examples: "Mrs. Jones, how did you feel when
you came to the courtroom and learned that you might sit on a
case where the Commonwealth seeks the death penalty?" OR
"How do you feel about life without parole compared to the
death penalty? NOT "Mrs. Jones, would you allow your
general support for the death penalty to interfere with your
ability to sit as a fair and impartial juror in this case?"
"Would you follow the law as the judge gave it to you?" Much
more of what you need to know about challenges for cause and
the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges is yielded by
open questions. There is a place for CLOSED questions. It is in
the rehabilitation of jurors who have expressed reservations
about the death penalty.
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Client involvement is another critical aspect of capital jury
selection. The ultimate question for the jury after all may be
whether to read your client out of the human race. That will be
easier for them to do if you appear distant from him, only
there because you were appointed to be. Clients should be in-
volved in jury selection to the extent of their capabilities, which
will vary. At a minimum, the client can be provided with a pad
and paper and consulted in the presence of the panel before
strikes are exercised. Some attorneys have secured permission
for the client to ask some of the questions. Jury selection is the
first opportunity to humanize the client before his jury.
Just as there is variety among jurors, defendants, and at-
torney, there certainly is among Circuit Court Judges. You will
sometimes encounter one who is impatient with open question-
ing or who does not see the relevance of a question. Most of
the time this is because the judge has not fully considered, and
advocates have failed to urge, the wide range of matters that
directly affect the jurors fitness to serve with respect to death
and life qualification and ability to give serious consideration to
a myriad of mitigating factors. Yo must respectfully, but firm-
ly, insist on the right of the accused to explore the attitudes of
jurors on these matters, not just ask brief leading questions. If
you are not permitted to conduct such an examination, you
must insure that the record reflects your objection and that the
objection is based in part on the violation of rights guaranteed
the accused by the 6th, 8th, and 14th Amendments to the Con-
stitution of the United States. 13
B. PRETRIAL ISSUES IN JURY SELECTION
1. Challenges to the Array. Your client has a right to a
grand and petit jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the
community. 14 Deprivation of that right may in a given case im-
plicate not only the Sixth Amendment, but also the Due Process
and Equal Protection clauses of the 14th Amendment. 15 In-
vestigating the selection and composition of the venire before
trial is essential for two reasons. First, if the issue is
meritorious, it will result in relief. Booker T. Hillery, was in-
dicated for murder in 1962 by a Grand Jury from which
members of his race had been systematically excluded. In 1986,
the United States Supreme Court reversed his conviction,
though a representative pool would have yielded but one more
black. 16 Second, investigating this challenge is essential because
if it is not made before the petit jury is empaneled, it is
almost certainly lost.17 Hillery moved to quash the indictment
before his trial and pursued the issue before state courts for 16
years.
Establishing a 6th amendment fair cross-section challenge re-
quires a showing that:
(1) the excluded group is a distinctive group in the
community;
(2) the representation of this group in jury venires is not fair
and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the
community; and
(3) the under-representation is due to systematic exclusion of
the group in the jury selection process. 
18
There has been a considerable volume of litigation about
what constitutes a cognizable group in satisfaction of the first
part of this test. It is clear that members of a particular racial
group or gender qualify. 19 There is no firm figure on the
amount of disparity sufficient to meet the second part of the
test. Any absolute disparity over ten per cent, however, may
make out a prima facie case in satisfaction of the third test and
shift the burden to the Commonwealth to explain the dispari-
ty.2 0 This determination will be affected by a court's evaluation
of the neutrality, in practice as well as on paper, of the pro-
cedure used to select the array.
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2. Batson Challenges. A procedure similar to the one
described above is available with respect to the selection of petit
jurors who will sit on the case. It extends to the previously
sacrosanct area of peremptory strikes. In Batson v. Kentucky,
2 1
the United States Supreme Court held that a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection
clause may be made out solely on evidence of the prosecutor's
use of peremptory strikes at defendant's trial. The requirements
are that defendant must be a member of a cognizable racial
group, and the prosecutor has exercised peremptory strikes to
remove members of that group from the venire. It is not ab-
solutely essential that all members of the group have been
stricken but as a practical matter, especially given the limited
number of peremptory strikes permitted in Virginia, 2 3 the
challenge will be difficult to sustain unless this is the case.
This peremptory strike practice by the prosecutor, plus any
other relevant circumstances (including, but not limited to
disparities in the selection of the array discussed previously)
establishes a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination and
places the burden on the prosecutor to articulate a neutral ex-
planation for striking the jurors. This explanation is evaluated
by the court.
No specific remedy is prescribed for a meritorious Batson
challenge. Possibilities include dismissal of the entire panel, or
reinstating the improperly stricken jurors on the panel. You
should decide on the remedy you think appropriate. You must,
of course, make the Batson motion before the jury is
empaneled.
C. CONCLUSION
The foregoing has been but an outline of the major issues in
capital jury selection and the applicable Virginia and federal
law. On these issues and others the Virginia Capital Case Clear-
inghouse can provide more detailed research and assistance, and
in addition perform the true clearinghouse function of making
sure what has been successful elsewhere is passed on to you.
Given the complexity of death penalty law and the significant
differences between a capital case and other criminal trials,
there is little reason for appointed counsel to go it alone. Both
the accused and the Commonwealth usually suffer when that
course of action is chosen.
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